There's strong evidence that the co-pilot aboard the Germanwings flight that crashed in the French Alps was, in a word, crazy. It appears he locked the post-9/11 reinforced cockpit door while the captain was using the toilet, and he also blocked the door override code as any cockpit occupant is allowed to do. The captain couldn't reenter the cockpit, and the co-pilot intentionally crashed the plane, killing himself and 149 others.
Exactly the same thing happened in 2013 in a murder-suicide crash in Africa that killed 33 people (including the perpetrator). And the same thing may have happened on at least three other occasions in the past several years.
Once is a fluke, but twice is a pattern. As my previous post described, aviation safety experts knew that the FAA's (and other regulators') orders to reinforce cockpit doors would result in more fatalities associated with crazy pilot scenarios. We're now seeing their unheeded warnings become real. And unfortunately copycat incidents are quite possible.
In the immediate aftermath of the Germanwings crash, airlines around the world are requiring that the cockpit always have two occupants, at all times (except when parked at the gate). Typically this would mean that when a pilot wants to step out to use the toilet a flight attendant would take his/her place. What this means in practice is that an 80 kilo crazy pilot now would have to incapacitate a 50 kilo flight attendant in order to commit murder-suicide.
While I appreciate the airlines' prompt change in operating practices, this change in policy will only help a little bit. The last line of defense will be, typically, a 50 kilo flight attendant with no knowledge of the switches and controls in the cockpit and no ability to pilot the airplane. If the crazy pilot wants to incapacitate that flight attendant, he/she will have the advantage of complete surprise. Maybe the airlines think differently, but I don't think this last line of defense is going to be much of a defense. Moreover, that flight attendant now has the opportunity to be the crazy one, and that's another, new risk.
What I think the regulators now need to do is not allow any occupant in the cockpit to disable the override code to open the door. According to press reports, on an Airbus A320 any knowledgeable cockpit occupant -- and the Germanwings co-pilot certainly was -- can block the override code from opening the door. That block lasts either 5 minutes or indefinitely -- press reports vary.
Why? I assume it's because the regulators were afraid that a crazy crewmember would open the door with the override code, storm the cockpit, incapacitate the pilots, and crash the plane. Well, yes, that's a possibility. But obviously there can be one or more crazy people in front of the door, in the cockpit.
There is an effective solution here, even if the regulators don't want to go back to pre-9/11 bashable (eventually) doors: a plane-wide alarm. That is, whenever the door is left open for a certain number of seconds, or whenever anybody uses the override code to open the door, a plane-wide alarm would sound. It could be a coded alarm that only the crew (and particularly knowledgeable passengers) understand, or it could be a general alarm that everybody understands ("Warning: Cockpit Door Open!"). But it would be an alarm that effectively declares, "We have a problem. Everybody work together now to save the plane." There should not be a 5 minute (or indefinite) block on the override code. That block should be about 10 seconds, during which time the door alarm sounds, plane-wide. It should not be possible to disable this particular alarm, though eventually it could stop sounding if the door is closed.
Let's hope the FAA and other regulators act more thoughtfully this time.
Exactly the same thing happened in 2013 in a murder-suicide crash in Africa that killed 33 people (including the perpetrator). And the same thing may have happened on at least three other occasions in the past several years.
Once is a fluke, but twice is a pattern. As my previous post described, aviation safety experts knew that the FAA's (and other regulators') orders to reinforce cockpit doors would result in more fatalities associated with crazy pilot scenarios. We're now seeing their unheeded warnings become real. And unfortunately copycat incidents are quite possible.
In the immediate aftermath of the Germanwings crash, airlines around the world are requiring that the cockpit always have two occupants, at all times (except when parked at the gate). Typically this would mean that when a pilot wants to step out to use the toilet a flight attendant would take his/her place. What this means in practice is that an 80 kilo crazy pilot now would have to incapacitate a 50 kilo flight attendant in order to commit murder-suicide.
While I appreciate the airlines' prompt change in operating practices, this change in policy will only help a little bit. The last line of defense will be, typically, a 50 kilo flight attendant with no knowledge of the switches and controls in the cockpit and no ability to pilot the airplane. If the crazy pilot wants to incapacitate that flight attendant, he/she will have the advantage of complete surprise. Maybe the airlines think differently, but I don't think this last line of defense is going to be much of a defense. Moreover, that flight attendant now has the opportunity to be the crazy one, and that's another, new risk.
What I think the regulators now need to do is not allow any occupant in the cockpit to disable the override code to open the door. According to press reports, on an Airbus A320 any knowledgeable cockpit occupant -- and the Germanwings co-pilot certainly was -- can block the override code from opening the door. That block lasts either 5 minutes or indefinitely -- press reports vary.
Why? I assume it's because the regulators were afraid that a crazy crewmember would open the door with the override code, storm the cockpit, incapacitate the pilots, and crash the plane. Well, yes, that's a possibility. But obviously there can be one or more crazy people in front of the door, in the cockpit.
There is an effective solution here, even if the regulators don't want to go back to pre-9/11 bashable (eventually) doors: a plane-wide alarm. That is, whenever the door is left open for a certain number of seconds, or whenever anybody uses the override code to open the door, a plane-wide alarm would sound. It could be a coded alarm that only the crew (and particularly knowledgeable passengers) understand, or it could be a general alarm that everybody understands ("Warning: Cockpit Door Open!"). But it would be an alarm that effectively declares, "We have a problem. Everybody work together now to save the plane." There should not be a 5 minute (or indefinite) block on the override code. That block should be about 10 seconds, during which time the door alarm sounds, plane-wide. It should not be possible to disable this particular alarm, though eventually it could stop sounding if the door is closed.
Let's hope the FAA and other regulators act more thoughtfully this time.
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